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LOUISIANA CIVIL PROCEDURE
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.*
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER
Church members who wanted to "see for themselves how much
money the church took in and how the money was spent"' filed suit
against their church and their pastor claiming a right to examine
the books and records of the church under Louisiana's Nonprofit
Corporation Law The trial court, in Bourgeois v. Landrum, granted
the order and the plaintiffs examined the books. The plaintiffs who
were not satisfied that all of the records had been produced sought
sanctions against the defendants for failure to answer in-
terrogatories. The trial court sustained the defendants' exception of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject manner. The court of appeal af-
firmed,3 reasoning that civil courts should interfere in church matters
only in property disputes and that the present issue did not involve
property rights but rather a possible dissension over church
management. In addition, the court stated that a church did not sub-
ject itself to review by civil courts simply because it was organized
under the Nonprofit Corporation Act; there had to be a property
dispute. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded.'
The supreme court rejected, as too restrictive, the position
taken by the court of appeal that civil courts are to become involved
in church matters only to resolve property disputes. The supreme
court reasoned that the first amendment circumscribes the authority
of civil courts with respect to ecclesiastical disputes in order to pro-
tect churches from secular interference in matters of church doc-
trine, practice, and administration;' this protection would not be
violated by granting plaintiffs' request in this case because by so do-
ing, civil courts would not be involving themselves in matters of a
religious nature-such as doctrine, policy, or management. The
court would be merely allowing the plaintiffs to inspect church
records. In addition the supreme court also disagreed with the court
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Bourgeois v. Landrum, 387 So. 2d 611, 612 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
2. LA. R.S. 12:223(A), (C) (1968).
3. 387 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
4. 396 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1981).
5. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Melivo-
jevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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of appeal's position that the church was not automatically subject to
the state's corporation statutes absent a property dispute. The
supreme court stated that the church as a nonprofit corporation was
subject to the provisions of the statute unless application of the
statute would violate the protection guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. Finding no such violation, the court concluded that under the
terms of the Nonprofit Corporation Law the plaintiffs had a right to
inspect the church records at any reasonable time upon their simple
request.
The supreme court was correct in rejecting the position taken
by the court of appeal because that position is both too narrow and
too broad. The position is too narrow in that it calls for dismissal of
any civil action involving a church unless the dispute is over property.
It is too broad in that it seems to be saying that in a property
dispute a civil court can exercise jurisdiction without considering
whether the resolution of that dispute would involve the court in
questions of church policy and doctrine. For example, in
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church' the United States Supreme
Court ruled that Georgia courts had violated the first amendment in
resolving a church property dispute under Georgia's implied trust
doctrine-that doctrine required courts to determine if the national
church had so departed .from the tenets of faith and practice exist-
ing at the time of the local churches' affiliation that the trust in
favor of the national church should be declared terminated. Such a
determination would necessarily involve civil courts in questions of
ecclesiastical doctrine and interpretation and the relative import-
ance of various tenets of faith and practice-an inquiry the first
amendment forbids courts to make.
The decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bourgeois
focuses on the central question-whether the civil action would in-
volve the court in question of church doctrine, policy, practice, and
administration. If such questions are involved the court must
dismiss the action; if they are not, the court can resolve the dispute
whether it involves property rights' or some other question such as
the validity of the election of the church's board of directors.8
6. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
7. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
8. Wilkerson v. Battiste, 393 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). The court decid-
ed the question of the validity of the election of the board of directors of a church
because the only inquiry was whether the method of election set out in the church
charter had been followed; this inquiry did not involve any question of religious law,
doctrine, policy, or practice. The court did refuse to hear the question relating to the
appointment of a minister because this issue was a purely ecclesiastical matter.
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STANDING TO SUE
When the Ramsey River Road Property Owners Association, a
nonprofit association, sued to enjoin construction of a bridge across
the Bogue Falaya River, the defendants objected that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring the action. The trial court overruled the ob-
jection and after trial rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff.
The court of appeal affirmed' and the supreme court granted cer-
tiorari and affirmed."
In resolving the issue of standing the Louisiana Supreme Court
applied the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,"
namely: "(1) the members would otherwise be able to bring the suit
in their own right, (2) the interests the association seeks to protect
are pertinent to its purpose and (3) neither .the claim asserted by the
association nor the relief sought requires the participation of in-
dividual members in the lawsuit." 2 In so doing the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that: (1) some of the members owned property
on the Bogue Falaya River and could sue in their individual
capacities to protect their property, (2) one of the purposes of the
Association was to institute actions to protect the environment, and
(3) the participation of individual members was not necessary for full
adjudication of the controversy. In addition, the court addressed a
concern, raised in a concurring opinion in Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v.
Werner Brothers, Inc.," that an association could be used to conceal
the real interests being asserted (that competitors could be mas-
querading as an environmental association) by noting that the
membership list had been made available to the defendants and that
the members had testified as to their interest in the litigation.
PLEADINGS
If a plaintiff compromises his claim against one of the alleged
joint tortfeasors, reserving his rights against the other, any
9. Ramsey River Rd. Property Owners v. Reeves, 387 So. 2d 1194 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980).
10. 396 So. 2d 873 (La. 1981).
11. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). These criteria had been used in the earlier case of Loui-
8iana Hotel-Motel Ass'n, Inc. v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 385 So. 2d 1193 (La.
1980). in which the court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of a resolution of the City-Parish Council imposing a moratorium on the
issuance of licenses to sell alcoholic beverages because there was no showing that (1)
individual members would suffer injury from the moratorium, (2) members could sue in
their individual capacities, or (3) the suit served any of the interests for which the
association had been formed.
12. 396 So. 2d 873, 874 (La. 1981).
13. 372 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
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recovery he obtains against the remaining defendant must be reduced
by the virile share of the released defendant, because the effect of
the compromise is to deprive the remaining defendant of his right to
enforce contribution from the released defendant through subroga-
tion to the rights of the plaintiff." This result occurs only where the
released defendant is found to be a joint tortfeasor and thus liable
in solido with the other defendant; the burden of establishing the
liability of the released defendant usually rests on the remaining
defendant."5 However, in Danks v. Maher,' where the plaintiff com-
promised her claim against the doctor (reserving her rights against
the hospital) late in the trial, the court stated that it would be unfair
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant hospital because the
hospital had had no warning that it would be called upon to prove
the negligence of the doctor. The court held that, under these cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff was bound by the allegations in her peti-
tion with respect to the negligence of the doctor. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs' recovery was reduced by one-half. The exception created
by Danks was an issue in two recent cases, Wall v. American
Employers Insurance Co.'7 and Raley v. Carter."
In Wall two sets of plaintiffs filed a claim for wrongful death
and claims for personal injuries against the drivers of the two
vehicles involved in an accident and also against the police jury that
maintained the intersection where the accident occurred. Both sets
of plaintiffs settled with the drivers and the drivers' insurers and
reserved their rights against the police jury. The trial court dismissed
the claim against the police jury and the court of appeal reversed
but, relying on Danks, reduced recovery against the police jury by
two-thirds on the grounds that the plaintiffs were bound by their
allegations with respect to the negligence of the released drivers.
The supreme court granted writs and ruled that the court of appeal
was in error in applying Danks because the instant case could be
distinguished from Danks on several points: The settlement had oc-
curred years before the trial; the defendant had raised the issue of
the negligence of the released drivers in a supplemental answer
praying that any judgment against it be reduced by two-thirds; at
trial the plaintiffs had introduced, without objection, evidence show-
ing the lack of negligence of the drivers and showing that the police
jury was solely at fault in the accident. The supreme court concluded
that the plaintiffs were not bound by their original petitions because
14. See LA. CIv. CoDE arts. 2103 & 2203; Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d
915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
15. 163 So. 2d 915, 922 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
16. 177 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
17. 386 So. 2d 79 (La. 1980).
18. 401 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. ist Cir. 1981).
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the pleadings had been amended by the evidence introduced without
objection. 9 Having settled this point, the court then considered
whether the drivers were at fault on the basis of the evidence
presented at trial and determined that they were. The judgment of
the court of appeal thus was affirmed but on different grounds.
In considering whether Danks should control the result in Wall,
it seems that Wall is distinguishable not only on the grounds stated
by the supreme court-the implied amendment of the pleadings-
but also because it was not unfair to impose on the police jury the
burden of proving fault on the part of the released drivers. The
settlement had occurred long before the trial, and the amended
answer filed by the police jury showed awareness of its position.
The grounds for the exception in Danks-the unfairness of shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant who would be un-
prepared-were simply not present in Wall.
In the second case, Raley v. Carter, the plaintiff had sued four
defendants to recover for injuries sustained in an industrial acci-
dent. On the morning of the trial, he dismissed three defendants
with reservation of rights against the remaining defendant. At the
trial no evidence was introduced by either party as to the neglig-
ence of the released defendants. The trial court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, and on appeal the judgment was reduced by
three-fourths-the virile shares of the released defendants. The
court of appeal followed Danks and ruled that placing the burden of
proving the negligence of the released defendants on the remaining
defendant would be unfair because the release occurred on the
morning of the trial, and the defendant would have been prepared to
present evidence only on the issue of his own negligence. The court
concluded that the plaintiff was bound by the allegations in his peti-
tion that the released defendants were joint tortfeasors liable in
solido with the unreleased defendant. Wall was distinguished on the
grounds that in that case evidence as to the non-liability of the
released defendants had been introduced by the plaintiff without ob-
jection from the defendant. The court in Raley seems to be saying
that if the plaintiff had amended his petition or had introduced
evidence as to the non-liability of the released defendants, as was
done in Wall, the result would have been different. But, as mention-
ed earlier, Wall is distinguishable from Danks on a more important
point, namely, that the release in Wall occurred well before trial;
thus there was no basis for finding that it would be unfair to require
the defendant to prove the negligence of the released defendants.
19. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1154.
[Vol. 42
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EXCEPTIONS
In International Matex Tank Terminals v. System Fuels, Inc.2 1
the defendant, on the day scheduled for the hearing on the plaintiffs
petition to evict the defendant in a summary proceeding, filed
declinatory exceptions of lis pendens and improper venue and a
peremptory exception of no right of action. The trial court sustained
the declinatory objections, but the court of appeal granted a writ
and reversed on the grounds that the filing of the peremptory ex-
ception was a general appearance which waived the objections
asserted in the defendant's declinatory exception. The supreme
court granted writs and reversed.
Ordinarily, if a defendant files a declinatory exception and then
files a peremptory exception before the court has ruled on the
declinatory exception, the defendant has made a general appearance
which has the effect of waiving the objections raised in the
declinatory exception (except lack of jurisdiction over subject matter),21
unless the defendant is required by law to plead the exceptions
together." Article 2593 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
"[Eixceptions ... to a petition in a summary proceeding shall be fil-
ed prior to the time assigned for, and shall be disposed of on, the
trial."23 Thus, the question presented in International Matex, was
whether a summary proceeding under article 2593 is one of the ex-
ceptions referred to in article 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
supreme court answered that article 2593 is an exception under article
7 because any other result would require the defendant either to
waive his declinatory exceptions by making a general appearance by
filing the peremptory exception before the court ruled on the
declinatory exceptions or to waive his peremptory exceptions by not
filing them prior to the trial as required by article 2593. This dilemma
would result because article 2593 requires that all exceptions be filed
prior to trial and that all exceptions be disposed of at trial.
Therefore, the only fair result is to allow the defendant to file all of
his exceptions together.
The decision reached by the court in International Matex is fair
to the defendant and carries out the intent of the Code reflected in
article 2593 that summary proceedings should be conducted ex-
peditiously.2' But an interesting point in the opinion is the court's
20. 398 So. 2d 1029 (La. 1981).
21. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 7 & 925.
22. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 7.
23. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2593.
24. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2591 provides, "Summary proceedings are those which
are conducted with rapidity ......
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citation to Foster v. Breaux" as an example of a case in which the
defendant is required by law to file the declinatory and peremptory
exceptions together. By citing Foster the court seems to be saying
that if the defendant has a defense of improper venue and a defense
of prescription based on improper venue, he can file the declinatory
exception objecting to venue and the peremptory exception object-
ing to prescription at the same time. But this point is by no means
clear in Foster, because, in that case, there is also language to the
effect that if the trial court rules that venue is not proper, it ceases
to be a competent court to rule on the defense of prescription.26
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Article 4916 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a
plaintiff may obtain a default judgment by producing relevant and
competent evidence which establishes a prima facie case; where the
claim is based on an open account, prima facie proof may be submitted
by affidavit." In Buddy Patterson Gateway Gulf Sevices v. Howell, 8
the plaintiff obtained a default judgment by introducing the petition,
a citation with the sheriff's return showing service, and an affidavit
of the correctness of the account. The petition and the affidavit
referred to an itemized account, but no such account was made part
of the record. On appeal, the judgment was reversed on the grounds
that the evidence was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
The court stated that in order to obtain a default judgment the
plaintiff must prove the essential allegations of his petition to the
same extent as if the defendant had filed an answer contesting
them; as applied to a suit on an open account, the plaintiff therefore
must introduce an itemized account and an affidavit of correctness.
DISCOVERY
In Fowler v. Jordan" the plaintiff obtained a judgment for at-
torney's fees and expenses when the defendant failed to appear on
the day set by the parties for taking the plaintiff's deposition. The
defendant had originally given written notice that the deposition
was to be taken on April 14, 1980, but the plaintiff's attorney con-
tacted the defendant's attorney and the deposition was rescheduled
for May 2, 1980, at which time the defendant failed to appear. No
written notice of the May 2, 1980, deposition was given and this
25. 263 La. at 1112, 270 So. 2d 526 (1972).
26. 263 La. at 1124, 270 So. 2d at 530.
27. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 4916.
28. 392 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
29. 397 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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omission, the court of appeal concluded, was fatal to the plaintiff's
claim for expenses and attorney's fees. The court interpreted article
144711 as requiring written notice as a prerequisite to a claim for ex-
penses and attorney's fees; only with such a notice would all parties
be made aware of their obligation to appear, and in addition, written
notice would eliminate the risk of misunderstandings which can occur
in oral communications.
Articles 1471"' and 14732 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide
for a variety of sanctions, including dismissal of the suit, which can
be imposed where, for example, a party fails to comply with an
order to permit discovery or fails to appear for the taking of his
deposition or fails to serve answers to interrogatories. In Allen v.
Smith" the plaintiff refused to comply with an order to produce for
inspection the motorcycle alleged to be defective, failed to appear on
the day set for the taking of his deposition and failed to answer in-
terrogatories. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit,
and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order to submit a
brief on the question of whether the dismissal should be with pre-
judice, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim with prejudice.
The court of appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion2' The
supreme court reversed on the grounds that a dismissal with pre-
judice was such a drastic remedy that it should be applied only in
extreme circumstances. In this case, the record did not show that
the noncompliance was due to the wilfulness, bad faith, or fault of
the plaintiff. Therefore, imposition of the drastic penalty of dis-
missal with prejudice was an abuse of discretion. But the supreme
court also believed that the imposition of other sanctions was ap-
propriate and ordered that the defendant be awarded costs and at-
torney's fees and that these payments should be made by the plain-
tiff's counsel because the record indicated that noncompliance was
due to the inattention of counsel. The court also ordered the plain-
tiff to comply with the discovery requests and stayed his action un-
til he complied.
In Allen the court sought to compel compliance with the re-
quests for discovery while protecting an innocent client from the
mistakes of counsel. The court believed that the fair result would be
to make the attorney pay for his inattention while protecting his
30. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1447.
31. LA. dODE CIV. P. art. 1471.
32. LA. CoDE Civ. P. art. 1473.
33. 390 So. -4d 1300 (La. 1980).
34. 380 So. 20 174 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
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client from a dismissal with prejudice which would have been a bar
to a subsequent suit on the same claim.35
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The case of Vermillion Corporation v. Vaughn" has led a
strenuous procedural life traveling from trial court to the court of
appeal to the United States Supreme Court-after denial of writs by
the Louisiana Supreme Court-back to the court of appeal, then to
the Louisiana Supreme Court which remanded it to the trial court
for a trial on the merits. The plaintiff sued to enjoin various defen-
dants from using canals it alleged were private and under its ex-
clusive control. The defendants took the position that the canals
were navigable waterways subject to public use. After a deposition
and affidavits had been filed, the plaintiff moved for summary judg-
ment; in opposition the defendants argued that they had a right to
use the canals as a substitute for the natural waterways which had
been destroyed by the man-made canals. Although this contention
was rejected as immaterial by the trial court and the court of ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the defendants'
allegations, if true, might constitute a defense under federal law to
the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. The court of appeal refused
to remand to the trial court for the introduction of evidence on this
question because the defendants' answers did not affirmatively
plead this defense, and their affidavits were not based on personal
knowledge; therefore, the court concluded that there was no genuine
issue of material fact and again affirmed the granting of the sum-
mary judgment."
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ of review and
reversed. With respect to the objection that the defendants had not
raised the defense of the destruction of the natural waterways, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that either the answer should be
considered amended by the evidence offered in the affidavit or a for-
mal amendment of the answer should be allowed in light of the af-
fidavits. The court also rejected the objection that the affidavits
could not be considered because they failed to show that they were
made on personal knowledge. The court stated that an affidavit
which did not affirmatively show that it was based on personal
knowledge could be considered by the court if no objection was raised
to it, unless it was clear that the affidavit was not based on personal
knowledge. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court followed
35. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 1673.
36. 397 So. 2d 490 (La. 1981).
37. 387 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
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its earlier ruling in Barnes v. Sun Oil Co.88 that the failure to show
that an affidavit is based on personal knowledge is a formal defect
which is waived if not objected to by a motion to strike or in some
other way. But an affidavit which fails to make the affirmative show-
ing of personal knowledge must be distinguished from one which
clearly shows that it was not based on personal knowledge, because
the latter is fundamentally defective and cannot be considered in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment."
DIRECTED VERDICTS
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1810'° provides for
the granting of directed verdicts in both jury and nonjury trials, but
it does not set forth what the standard should be or whether the
standard should be different in each of these cases. In addition, the
article does not state whether the dismissal of the plaintiff's case on
a motion for directed verdict can be with or without prejudice.
These questions were addressed in recent cases decided by the
supreme court and courts of appeal.
In Breithaupt v. Sellers," an action to recover for injuries sus-
tained when the plaintiff was shot while hunting, the trial judge
granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
grounds that the plaintitf's failure to wear "hunter orange" was con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law and barred recovery. The
court of appeal affirmed but the supreme court reversed. The su-
preme court stated that the question of whether the plaintiffs negli-
gence caused his injury was a question of fact for the jury; in decid-
ing whether the motion for a directed verdict was properly granted,
the court adopted the test that had been used by the court of ap-
peal-namely, could reasonable people looking at the evidence in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff arrive at different conclusions.
Applying the standard, the supreme court concluded that it was er-
ror to grant the motion for a directed verdict and remanded for a
new trial. The standard applied by the supreme court without com-
ment in Breithaupt had been applied earlier by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal in Campbell v. Mouton.'" In Campbell the appellate
court adopted the standard for directed verdicts in jury cases used
38. 362 So. 2d 761 (La. 1978). See also Benoit v. Burger Chef Systems of
Lafayette, Inc., 257 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
39. See Walker v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 264 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972);
Hidalgo v. General Fire & Cas. Co., 254 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
40. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1810.
41. 390 So. 2d 870 (La. 1980).
42. 373 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
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by the federal courts"3 because article 1810 is based on Rule 50 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The same standard had also
been applied in other circuits."'
Where the trial is without a jury, the courts of appeal 5 have ap-
plied a different standard. If a motion for directed verdict is made
at the close of the plaintiff's case, the court must resolve the issues
of fact based on a preponderance of the evidence test instead of
determining, as would be done in a jury case, whether the evidence
is sufficient to enable reasonable minds to reach different conclu-
sions. In deciding the proper standard to be used in non-jury cases,
the courts again looked to federal cases'" for guidance. In so doing
they followed the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Madi-
son v. Traveler's Insurance Co.: that when state rules of procedure
are obtained from the federal rules, the state courts may look to the
federal cases interpreting those provisions for guidance.
On the question of whether the dismissal on a motion for
directed verdict could be with or without prejudice, the court of ap-
peal for the first circuit, in Littles v. Southeastern Fidelity In-
surance Co.," held that the dismissal must be with prejudice. In
reaching this decision the court was persuaded by two factors. First,
although article 1810(B) was taken almost verbatim from Rule 41(B)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the following language was
omitted from the Louisiana article: "Unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision ...
operates as an adjudication upon the merits." The court interpreted
this omission to mean that Louisiana judges were not intended to
have the same discretion that federal judges had to dismiss with or
without prejudice. This intepretation was strengthened by a second
factor. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1810 provides that,
"[tihe Court may then determine the facts and render judgment
against the plaintiff... . " In light of this language the court, in Lit-
tles, concluded that a determination on the facts is a determination
on the merits which is a final adjudication of the matter and makes
a dismissal without prejudice inappropriate because such dismissals
are usually based on procedural grounds."
43. See Boeng Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. See Perkins v. American Mach. & Foundary Co., 385 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980); Regas v. Argonaut S.W. Ins. Co., 379 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
45. Littles v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980); Sevin v. Shape Spa For Health & Beauty, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1011 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1980).
46. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Farmer, 427 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1970).
47. 308 So. 2d 784 (La. 1975).
48. 398 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 580. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1672; "A judgment dismissing an action
shall be rendered upon application of any party, when the plaintiff fails to appear on
[Vol. 42
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JUDGMENTS
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:843.1,0 the clerk is authoriz-
ed to issue a demand for unpaid court costs to the party primarily
responsible not later than one hundred and twenty days after final
termination of the civil action. This statute seems to mean that if a
judgment has been rendered against the defendant condemning him
to pay the costs of the proceedings, the demand for payment of
costs would be made to the defendant. But would the result be dif-
ferent if the defendant had taken a suspensive appeal from the judg-
ment? The supreme court in Meyers v. Basso ' ruled that it would.
The court held that where the defendant takes a suspensive appeal
from a judgment casting him for costs the plaintiff remains the party
primarily responsible for the usual costs of the trial"2 until the judg-
ment becomes definitive. Thus the clerk would not be able to de-
mand the costs from the defendant until the judgment of the court
of appeal against the defendant becomes final and executory. 3 The
supreme court stated that this result protects the clerk because he
can collect costs from the plaintiff either in advance or as they ac-
crue and protects the defendant who would otherwise be exposed to
the risk of trying to recover the costs he paid from a possibly insol-
vent plaintiff if the judgment against him is reversed on appeal. The
plaintiff who advanced the costs would be protected by the suspen-
sive appeal bond." Since the court concluded that the clerk could not
seek costs from the defendant during the suspensive appeal, it re-
versed the award of attorney's fees in favor of the clerk even
though the court of appeal affirmed the judgment against the defen-
dant (thus making his demand for restitution of costs paid under
protest moot). Because the clerk failed to meet his burden of proof
by furnishing the defendant with an itemized account of the costs as
required by the statute," the supreme court assumed that the costs
were for the usual expenses of trial rather than for the special ex-
penses of the jury trial for which the defendant would have been
responsible."
the day set for trial. In such case the court shall determine whether the judgment of
dismissal shall be with or without prejudice."
50. LA. R.S. 13:843.1 (1978).
51. 398 So. 2d 1026 (La. 1981).
52. Special costs incurred for jury trials would be the responsibility of the party
requesting the jury trial. Id. at 1028 n,4.
53. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1842 & 2167 (Supp. 1977).
54. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2124 (Supp. 1977).
55. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:843 (1950) provides for the award of attorney's
fees when the clerk seeks payment of costs.
56. Id
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APPEALS
Article 2121 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "[ain
appeal is taken by obtaining an order therefor, within the delay
allowed, from the court which rendered the judgment.""1 If the
appellant timely files his motion and order for appeal but the order
is not signed within the delay allowed for the appeal should the ap-
peal be dismissed as untimely? This question divided the courts of
appeal. The first circuit decided en banc in a five to four decision, in
Traigle v. Gulf Coast Aluminum Corp.,8 that the appeal should be
dismissed. The fourth circuit, in Scales v. State,5 ruled that the ap-
peal was timely taken within the meaning of article 2121. The su-
preme court granted writs in these cases and also in Peters v. Liv-
ingston Wood Products, Inc.," and held that where the order is filed
timely the appeal has been properly taken even if the order is not
signed until the delay has expired." The supreme court stated that
originally the signing of the order of devolutive appeal was very im-
portant because the order fixed the amount of the devolutive appeal
bond 2 and since the bond had to be filed within the delay allowed
for taking the appeal, 3 the order also had to be signed within that
time. But now that security is no longer required for the taking of a
devolutive appeal" the signing of the order is a mere formality and
so, the signing of this order after the delays had run should not
defeat the appeal where the appellant had timely filed the order.
The court's conclusion was also influenced by the fact that all
pleadings must be filed with the clerk 5 and, with respect to the
order of appeal, the clerk has the duty to secure the signature of the
judge or he can sign the order of appeal himself (except in Orleans
Parish). In the light of these facts, any failure to have the order
signed timely is not an error imputable to the appellant and article
2161 provides that no appeal shall be dismissed unless the error or
fault is imputable to the appellant." Perhaps in the light of Traigle,
57. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2121.
58. 391 So. 2d 1290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ granted, 396 So. 2d 909 (1981).
59. 391 So. 2d 871 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ granted, 396 So. 2d 909 (1981).
60. 393 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ granted, 396 So. 2d 910 (1981).
This case followed Traigle.
61. Traigle v. Gulf Coast Aluminum Corp., 399 So. 2d 183 (La. 1981), rev'g 391 So.
2d 1290, and 393 So. 2d 300; affg 391 So. 2d 871.
62. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2124.
63. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2087.
64. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2124 (Supp. 1977): "No security is required for a devolu-
tive appeal."
65. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 253.
66. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 281 & 282.
67. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2161.
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the procedure for taking a devolutive appeal should be simplified by
requiring only the filing of a notice of appeal within the delays
allowed. This would eliminate the signing of the order which is now
merely a formality."
In Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.," the parents of a
deceased motorcyclist filed separate suits to recover for his
wrongful death and for the pain and suffering he endured before he
died. The first suit was brought against the driver of the vehicle
that had turned in front of the deceased and her insurer and the second
was brought against the uninsured motorist insurer of the deceased
(Commercial Union) and against the parents' uninsured motorist in-
surer (Lumbermens). The insurers filed several exceptions which
were overruled and also filed a third-party demand against the
driver. The cases were consolidated for trial and after the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant driver, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing all claims. The plaintiffs appealed,
but the insurers did not appeal or answer the plaintiffs' appeal. The
third circuit reversed and rendered judgment against the defendant
driver and her insurer and also against Lumbermens and Commer-
cial Union. The court also considered the insurers' third-party de-
mand against the driver even though the insurers had not sought
modification of the judgment with respect to their third-party
demands by filing an answer to the appeal."0 The court ruled on the
third-party demand because the record was complete and to remand
for consideration of these demands would be contrary to the prin-
ciples of judicial economy and efficiency. The court decided that, as
a matter of law, the uninsured motorist insurers had no right of sub-
rogation against the defendant tortfeasor." The supreme court
granted Lumbermens' petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed.
Lumbermens asserted, among other allegations of error, that the
court of appeal erred in finding that the deceased was covered by
his parents' policy. This point had been raised by exception in the
trial court and was overruled, but it was not raised in the appellate
court, and the plaintiffs' argued that therefore it had been aban-
doned. The supreme court disagreed on the grounds that the defen-
dants could not have asserted the error on appeal before judgment
because the overruling of the exception was not a final judgment
68. See FED. R. App. P. 3, 4. This suggestion was also made by the first circuit in
Traigle v. Gulf Coast Aluminum, 391 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
69. 387 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
70. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2133 (Supp. 1968 & 1970).
71. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (1950); Nieman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1003 (La.
1979).
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and did not cause irreparable injury; and furthermore, since the
defendants had received a favorable judgment on the merits, they
were under no obligation to raise the point by appeal or even by
answer since they sought no modification of the judgment. Having
determined that the issue had not been abandoned and was properly
before it, the supreme court went on to state that the better prac-
tice would have been for Lumbermens to have answered the appeal
because the issue then would have been considered by the court of
appeal, and the supreme court would have had the benefit of the
court's judgment. For failing to answer, Lumbermens was assigned
the costs of the writ even though it was successful on the merits.
The supreme court reversed the judgment against Lumbermens be-
cause it found that the deceased was not covered by his parents'
policy. ""
Bond raises some interesting points. The first is the willingness
of the court of appeal to consider the insurers' third-party demands
against the driver even though the insurers had not appealed or filed
an answer to the plaintiffs' appeal. Although no harm was done
because the court affirmed the dismissal of the third-party demands
on other grounds, this procedure seems to be contrary to the intent
of articles 2082 and 2133 of the Code of Civil Procedure that ques-
tions concerning an incidental demand be presented by either appeal
or answer. This procedure also raises questions of fairness to the
third-party defendant who would be entitled to believe that no ques-
tion involving his liability to the third-party plaintiff would be
before the court of appeal because no appeal or answer had raised
that point and who would therefore make no defense in the court of
appeal. Another interesting point in Bond is the statement by the
supreme court that the better practice for the successful litigant is
to raise objections to the overruling of his exceptions by answer to
the appeal. Although this procedure does not seem to be required
by article 2133 because the appellee does not want to have the judg-
ment modified, revised or reversed-it does have the advantage of
raising these issues before the court of appeal for consideration in
the event that the judgment in favor of the defendant is reversed.
This procedure would also give the supreme court the benefit of the
court of appeal's consideration of these issues and would save a
litigant in Lumbermens' position the cost of a writ of certiorari.
Thus it seems that a defendant who is successful in the trial court
but who believes that the trial court was wrong in overruling his ex-
ceptions should answer the appeal and should assert as error the
overruling of his objections as an alternative basis for upholding the
judgment in his favor.
71a. The supreme court, on rehearing, reversed and further held that the unin-
sured motorists' insurer had a right of subrogation. 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981).
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SUPERVISORY WRITS
In Herlitz Construction Co. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia,
Inc."2 the trial court overruled the defendants' exception of no cause
of action and the court of appeal denied the application for super-
visory writs on the grounds that supervisory jurisdiction should be
exercised only where there is palpable error and the risk of irre-
parable injury." The supreme court granted a writ of review and
reversed. The supreme court stated that the court of appeal was in
error in requiring a showing of irreparable injury before it would
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction because such a showing would
entitle a litigant to appeal an interlocutory ruling, and supervisory
jurisdiction is intended to apply to situations not covered by the
right of appeal.' The supreme court concluded that in a case such as
this, where the overruling of the exception is arguably incorrect and
a reversal will terminate the litigation and there is no dispute of
fact to be resolved, the interests of judicial efficiency and fairness
would be served if the court of appeal considered the merits of an
objection which could, if sustained, avoid the expense of an un-
necessary trial on the merits. The supreme court remanded the case
to the court of appeal for a consideration of the merits of the defen-
dant's objection."
RES JUDICATA
In 1975 Juban Properties was successful in a suit against Claitor
for a declaratory judgment recognizing his right to build a fence.
The court of appeal declared that the fence would not violate a prior
reciprocal agreement between the parties." The fence was built, and
in 1978 Claitor, R.G. Claitor's Realty (the partnership which had ac-
quired the property adjoining the fence) and another plaintiff sued
Juban Properties and other defendants seeking removal of the fence
on the grounds that it interfered with a servitude existing in favor
of the plaintiffs' property. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' action
was barred by the res judicata effect of the prior declaratory judg-
ment. The court of appeal affirmed and the supreme court granted
writs and affirmed."
72. 396 So. 2d 878 (La. 1981).
73. Id. at 878.
74. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 2083.
75. The defendant's objection was that the only item of damages recoverable for
breach of an obligation to pay money is interest. 396 So. 2d at 878.
76. Juban Properties, Inc. v. Claitor. 354 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
77. R.G. Claitor's Realty v. Juban, 391 So. 2d 394 (La. 1980).
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The supreme court interpreted Civil Code article 2286 as requir-
ing identity of demand, cause, and parties between the two actions
in order for the principle of res judicata to apply. The court found
that the same thing was demanded in both suits; the thing demanded
in the first suit was recognition of the right to build the fence and
the second suit demanded removal of the fence. On the second point,
identity of cause, the plaintiffs argued that the first judgment was
based on the reciprocal agreement whereas the basis for the second
suit was the creation of a servitude in favor of the plaintiffs' property
apart from the reciprocal agreement. The supreme court found from
the record in the first suit that the issue of such a servitude had
been raised in the pleadings, and evidence had been introduced on
this question. The silence of the first judgment on this issue meant
that it had been rejected-a final judgment is held to dispose of all
issues raised by the pleadings and on which evidence has been in-
troduced unless the issue has been specially reserved. 8 The supreme
court found identity of parties even though one of the plaintiffs, R.
G. Claitor's Realty, had not been a party to the first suit-it had ac-
quired the property during the litigation and thus became a suc-
cessor of the party of record. A concurring opinion found identity of
parties because Claitor, who was a general partner of the partner-
ship that acquired the property, stipulated that the transfer would
not be used as a defense.
In dissent, Justice Dennis argued that the second suit was based
on a new theory relying on article 2275-the creation of a servitude
through the in-court confession under oath by Juban that he had
given Claitor permission to use the area on which the fence was
built. The majority, on rehearing, acknowledged that the reference
to article 2275 was a new argument but reaffirmed the position
taken in the original opinion that the issue of whether that verbal
agreement created a servitude was fully litigated in the first suit
and could not be relitigated.9
Only future cases will make it clear whether Justice Dennis is
correct in asserting that Juban marks a departure from the court's
position with respect to res judicata. If Juban is read as saying that
res judicata barred the second suit even though a new theory of
recovery was asserted, then Louisiana would be moving closer to
the common law principle of res judicata which bars relitigation of
the same claim even if the second suit is based on a different theory
of recovery. But it must be remembered that the majority expressly
based its decision on the finding that the issue asserted in the second
suit-creation of a servitude by verbal agreement-had been
litigated in the first suit.
78. See Sewell v. Argonaut S.W. Ins. Co., 362 So. 2d 758 (La. 1978).
79. 391 So. 2d at 403.
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